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STUDENT COMMENTS
AN ANATOMY OF SECTIONS 2-201 AND 2-202 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE)
The sole purpose of this comment is to read two sections of the Uniform
Commercial Code.' However, a worthwhile reading of any statute consti-
tutes an anatomy for it dissects the statute to determine the relation and
function of its various clauses and provisions. In addition, this comment will
endeavor to indicate basic innovations and nuances promulgated by the Code.
The statute of frauds2
 and the parol evidence rule are considered within
the same comment because of their similarity of purpose and operation. Both
have as their object the stabilization of written agreements and the sup-
posedly concomitant purpose of preventing fraud by limiting the use of oral
testimony before the trier of fact.4
I. SECTION 2-201. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS: STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A. INTRODUCTION
Statutory requirements that a contract be in writing serve to accurately
define the obligation and to remove the possibility of using perjured evidence
to prove a non-existent contract . 8
 This is accomplished by excluding oral
testimony from the trier of fact if the statute is not satisfied.
The original statute of frauds was enacted in England in 1677 and ap-
plied, in part, to the sale of "goods, wares and merchandise" in the amount
"of ten pounds sterling or upward."' The earliest uniform codification of
the statute in the United States was incorporated in the Uniform Sales Act, 7
which closely paralleled the quoted section of the English statute. It applies
to "a contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value
of five hundred dollars8
 or upwards. . . ."8
B. THE BASIC METHOD OF SATISFYING THE STATUTE
2-201 (1). Except as otherwise provided in this section a con-
tract for the sale of goodsN for the price of $500 or more is not
1
 The Uniform Commercial Code may hereafter be referred to as the Code.
2
 The statute of frauds may hereafter be referred to as the statute.
3
 The parol evidence rule may hereafter be referred to as the rule.
3 Williston, Contracts § 448 (3d ed. 1960) ; 2 Corbin, Contracts § 275 (1950).
5 See note 4 supra.
6 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677).
7
 The Uniform Sales Act may hereafter be referred to as the Sales Act.
8
 Many states varied this amount in adopting the act. Some states reduced the
amount to $50. Williston, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5068, gives a complete listing of the
required minimums.
9 Uniform Sales Act 4.
UCC § 2-105:
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other
than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article
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enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between
the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insuf-
ficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but
the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the
quantity of goods shown in such writing. Footnote added.]
The scope of the statute of frauds within this section of the Code is
narrower than under corresponding provisions of the Sales Act. Section 2-201
does not apply to choses in actionll and price has replaced value in estab-
lishing a minimum worth below which the statute will not apply. "Price"
may be defined as a sum of money for which an article is sold, but "value"
may be regarded as including the incidental benefits of a contract and con-
sequently is a broader concept than price.' 2
The Code's requirement testing the sufficiency of a writing may con-
stitute a departure from decisions interpreting the Sales Act. The Code re-
quires "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made. . . ." In contrast to the Sales Act requirement that there be "some
note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale," 18 the official Code
comment14
 states that "the required writing need not contain all the material
terms of the contract. . . . "15
 This is contrary to some decisions interpreting
the Sales Act which hold that the writing must set out all the essential terms
of the agreement."
Quantity is the only essential term that must be stated in order for the
writing to comply with section 2-201(1). This subsection specifies that the
writing will not be regarded as insufficient if it omits or incorrectly states a
term, but provides that the quantity shown in the writing will limit the
8) and things in action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and
growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in the
section on goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107).
n See UCC § 1-206.
12
 Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code 33 (1958).
13 Uniform Sales Act § 4.
14
 When a state legislature enacts the Code only the numbered sections become
part of the statutory law of that jurisdiction, The official comments, authored by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute are not adopted. The first comment to the official text follows the long title of
the Code. It states:
Uniformity throughout American jurisdictions is one of the main objectives of
this Code; and that objective cannot be obtained without substantial uniformity
of construction. To aid in uniform construction these comments set forth the
purpose of various provisions of this Act to promote uniformity, to aid in
viewing the Act as an integrated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruc-
tion.
This argument for the interpretive authority of the Code's comments hoists itself by
its own bootstraps since it is contained in a comment, but its logic appears cogent enough
to furnish independent support.
15 Comment 1 to UCC § 2-201.
to Webster v. Condon, 248 Mass. 269, 142 N,E. 777 (1924) ; Western Metals Co. v.
Hartman Ingot Metal Co., 303 Ill, 479, 135 N.E. 744 (1922); 49 Am. Jur. Statute of
Frauds § 332 (1943),
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extent to which the contract will be enforceable. It would seem manifestly
fairer to allow parol evidence on the missing term while the stated quantity
acts as a shield against the possible use of perjured evidence to prove a
totally nonexistent agreement.i 7 This argument is given added impetus by
those provisions of the Code which allow the formation of a contract though
there be no agreement on price, 15 place of payment,' 9 delivery,2° general
quality,21 time22 or other details of performance. 23
Although the Code does not pronounce a writing insufficient merely
because it omits or incorrectly states a term, it does not expressly state what
constitutes a sufficient writing. Beyond the necessity of a statement of quan-
tity there lies the familiar gray area of statutory law which can only be
defined by an accumulated body of case law. A recent Pennsylvania case
has made a contribution to this definitive process.24 The writing in question
spoke of an "intention" to award a contract and referred to the future re-
ceipt of a formal order. On this basis the court held that the writing was
nothing more than a preliminary negotiation and was therefore insufficient
to bind its sender. There was no quantity stated in the writing, but the court
did not elect to rest its decision solely on the absence of this essential
ingredient. The case is authority for the proposition that the writing must
unequivocally cover the present existence of a contract in order to be suffi-
cient within the meaning of this subsection.
However, the basic question remains undefined; "how many terms other
than quantity may be omitted from the writing before the courts will pro-
nounce the writing insufficient?" It is submitted that the courts should be
guided by the Code's commentators and simply require that the writing
indicate the existence of a real transaction. 25 This indication could be safely
gleaned from little more than a statement of quantity mentioned in connec-
tion with the present existence of a contract. Such a writing which must be
signed26
 by the charged party would indicate that the allegation is based
upon something more than mere fraud, i.e., a real transaction, and would
thus placate the purpose behind the statute.27
 The party seeking to prove
the contract must still meet the burden of proof in establishing the agree-
17 Hawkland, op. cit. supra note 12, at 27.
18 UCC § 2-305.
19 UCC § 2-310.
20 UCC § 2-308.
21 UCC § 2-312.
22 UCC § 2-309.
23 UCC § 2-311.
24
 John H. Wickersham E & C Co. v. Arbutus Steel Co., 58 Lanc. Rev. 164 (1962).
(See Annotations, supra.) This case determined the sufficiency of a writing under 2-201(2),
but the sufficiency requirements of 2-201(2) and 2-201(1) are the same. Thus, such
decisions under one subsection are applicable to the other.
25 Comment 1 to UCC § 2-201: "All that is required is that the writing afford a
basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction." This criteria
was cited by the court in Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co., 396 Pa.
506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).
26 Comment 1 to UCC § 2-201: ". . . any authentication which identifies the party
to be charged .. . ."
27 See note 4 supra.
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ment.28
 A further margin of safety is furnished by the Code's unconscionable
contract section under which the court could refuse to enforce any uncon-
scionable contract found by the jury. 29
 Fortified by these assurances the
court should allow the proponent of the contract the opportunity of present-
ing oral evidence of the agreement to the trier of fact.
C. SOME ALTERNATE METHODS OF SATISFYING THE STATUTE
1. Merchant's Confirmation
2-201 (2). Between merchants if within a reasonable time a
writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the
sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its
contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such
party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given
within ten days after it is received.
This subsection has no parallel in the Sales Act. It establishes an alter-
nate method of complying with the Code's statute of frauds provided both
parties to the alleged contract are merchants.2°
If a writing in confirmation of a contract is received by a party subse-
quently charged with the breach of an agreement, it may preclude his use
of the statute of frauds as a defense exactly as if the requirements of sub-
section (1) were met.
Such a writing must be sent "within a reasonable time." This time
period would presumably relate to the moment when the alleged contract
was entered into, but a problem presents itself when we consider how this
moment is to be determined. Must the written confirmation recite when the
alleged contract was formed or will extrinsic evidence of either a testimonial
or documentary nature be received? If documentary evidence is necessary to
prove the point of agreement, the proponent of the contract will be con-
fronted with an illogical barrier. Such evidence must be authenticated 31
and the most common means of accomplishing this, when the sale of goods
is involved, is by the use of contemporaneous writings corresponding in time
and contents32
 or through an admission of the other party." If either of
28 Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co., supra note 25.
29 UCC § 2-302:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may re-
fuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
8° UCC § 2-104:
(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge
or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge
or skill.
31 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2128 (3d ed. 1940).
32 Id. § 2131.
33 Id.	 2132.
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these methods were open to the proponent of the contract, he presumably
wouldn't be struggling to satisfy the statute by resorting to this subsection
but would have the necessary writings required by 2-201(1). It does not
seem that the reasonable time clause was meant to be used defensively for
this would result in an admission under 2-201(3) (b), which will be subse-
quently considered.
There appear to be two avenues open to the courts in construing the
"reasonable time" clause. The written confirmation must recite the time of
the alleged agreement and thus testify to its own timeliness, or the court
will receive parol evidence on the alleged date of the contract. Since it will
be shown that the onus of this subsection rests on the party being charged,
it would seem logical that the party seeking to overcome the statute be allowed
to satisfy the reasonable time clause either by parol evidence or by the use of
the confirmation itself. This construction does not conflict with the Code's
definition of "reasonable time." 3 +
A lower court in Pennsylvania has rendered a decision which indicates
that it would receive oral testimony on the time interval between the alleged
contract and the confirmation." The court in ruling on a demurrer to the
complaint held that a confirmation written "three days after the alleged
contract" would be within the reasonable time required, but made note of
the fact that the writing itself did not allude to the existence of a contract.
Since the court was unwilling to sustain such a demurrer it must have been
prepared to receive oral evidence on the time of the alleged agreement.
The writing which constitutes the confirmation must be "sufficient
against the sender." This clause presents problems of sufficiency similar to
those previously discussed in conjunction with subsection 2-201(1).
The party receiving the confirmation must have "reason to know its
contents." This requirement may cause the courts a good deal of trouble by
way of fact situations in which the party claiming benefit of the statute had
control of the confirmatory correspondence, but failed to acquire actual
knowledge of the contents. Can it be maintained that such a party had "rea-
son to know" within the meaning of the Code? Should the lack of knowledge
be attributable to the failure of an employee to properly inform his superiors,
the courts could resort to the common law of agency" and rule that the
principal is bound by and charged with the knowledge of his agent." It is
specified that the confirmation must be received, but it is difficult to con-
34 UCC § 1-204:
(1) Whenever this Act requires any action to be taken within a reasonable
time, any time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature,
purpose and circumstances of such action.
35 John H. Wickersham E & C Co. v. Arbutus Steel Co., supra note 24.
36 UCC § 1-103:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement
its provisions.
37 Fay v. Swicker, 154 Ohio St. 341, 96 N.E.2d 196 (1950).
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ceive of a situation in which the receiving party would not have reason to
know the contents once the writing came under his control.
It is highly possible that the courts may require the proponent of the
contract to prove that the confirmation was actually received. The previously
cited Pennsylvania case held that an allegation of receipt was essential to
the complaint." This indicates that the charging party would be expected to
prove such receipt. Rigid enforcement of this requirement could do much
to neutralize the operation of this subsection for it would be the rare case
in which a merchant would be able to muster sufficient proof of such an
allegation.
The required "notice of objection" does not have to be actually received
by the confirming merchant in order to afford the objecting merchant the
protection of the statute." The official comment on the giving of notice
states that "the essential fact is the proper dispatch of the notice, not its
receipt." 4 ° The heart of this subsection is the provision that once the con-
firmation is received, the recipient must object to its contents within ten
days or be denied the protection of the statute.
Probably one of the most sacrosanct rules of contract Iaw is that silence,
of itself, is not acceptance.'" It should be made clear that it was not the
intention of the Code's draftsmen to do violence to this rule. However, under
this subsection, silence is regarded as a commercial acquiescence sufficient to
deprive a merchant of the statute of frauds as a defense. Silence indicates
that there is some real basis to the charge that a contract exists because there
would normally be a disavowal of any agreement to which the charged party
was unrelated and uncommitted. Such a denial would be expected in the
normal course of business." It is again emphasized that the proponent of the
contract is still confronted with the task of proving the existence of a con-
tract.'
What constitutes a "notice of objection" under this subsection? How
comprehensive must such an objection be in order to afford its maker the
protection of the statute? An interesting situation could arise if the party
charged with the contract sought to disaffirm the confirmation and inad-
vertently indicated by his denial that the suit rested on a real transaction.
Assume, e.g., the written objection mentioned only price. It is arguable that the
charging party should be allowed the opportunity of circumventing the
statute since anything less than an unqualified objection may testify to the
38
 John H. Wickersham E & C Co. v. Arbutus Steel Co., supra note 24.
30 UCC § 1-201:
(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another by
taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary
course whether or not such other actually comes to know of it. A person "re-
ceives" a notice or notification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the contract
was made or at any other place held out by him as the place for receipt
of such communication.
4° Comment 26 to UCC § 1-201.
41 Royal Ins. Co. v. Beatty, 119 Pa. 6, 12 Atl. 607 (1898).
42 Hogan, Symposium: 4 Ann. Surv. of Mass. Law 14 (1957).
43 Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co., supra note 25.
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reality of the transaction and the objecting party's connection to it. This
would insure that the party being charged with the contract was not being
wed to a totally nonexistent transaction and would thus satisfy the basic
aim of the statute of frauds. 44 However, this argument is based on the as-
sumption that the objection mentioned the price alone and ignores the
ingredient of quantity which serves as a common denominator of all the
subsections under 2-201. There are several ways in which a quantity require-
ment may attach to the objection. Conservatives might insist on the objec-
tion containing a reference to quantity, which would set the limit of recovery
if the contract was ultimately proved. This would actually demand satisfac-
tion of the requirements of subsection (1). Liberals might argue that once
the confirmation mentioned a quantity, the denying party would be deemed
to have assented to it provided his objection made no specific disclaimer of
the stated quantity. As a suggested middle ground a requirement could be
imposed calling for some reference in the objection to the quantity stated
in the confirmation. However, it would be a difficult question of fact to
determine when a sufficient reference had been made.
From the foregoing it may be seen that anything short of an unequivocal
and complete denial poses several problems which the courts will have to
ponder before answering the question of what constitutes an effective "notice
of objection."
Since there are no provisions in the Sales Act comparable to this sub-
section of the Code, it is possible for the unethical businessman to hold a
confirmation, sufficient against the sender, while studying the market to
determine if he wishes to go through with the oral contract. If he decides
the contract is against his interests, he can claim the statute as a defense.
The obvious inequity of this situation is remedied by this subsection which
requires him to object within ten days or forfeit the protection of the statute.
It is possible that a fraudulent party might send out letters in confirmation
of nonexistent oral agreements in hopes that some might go unchallenged.
It has been maintained that this danger "is a small price to pay for the
many positive benefits effected by the subsection." 45 Care should be taken
to advise clients of the consequences in neglecting to promptly object to con-
firmations of totally unfounded oral contracts.
2. Specially Manufactured Goods
2-201(3) (a). A contract which does not satisfy the require-
ments of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the
buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course
of the seller's business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is
received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that
the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning
of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement. . .
The Sales Act specifies that the statute of frauds does not apply "if the
goods are to be manufactured by the seller especially for the buyer and are
44 Williston, op. cit. supra note 4.
45 Hawkland, op. cit. supra note 12, at 29.
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not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business.""
The Code is more restrictive in its corresponding provision as it requires
either a substantial beginning in manufacture or commitments for procure-
ment. The change of position must take place "before notice of repudiation
is received." This contraction may seem out of step with the Code's liberal
cadence, but is logical when examined in light of the raison d'être behind this
alternate method of meeting the requirements of the statute of frauds. Why
should specially manufactured goods be treated any differently from the sale
of other articles? One plausible reason is that manufacturers do not normally
produce goods, otherwise useless to them, on the mere chance that they may be
able to prove a fraudulent contract with the alleged buyer. If the buyer is at-
tempting to prove a contract it is even more unlikely that the manufacturer
would produce unique goods without some sort of existing agreement. Some
authorities maintain that a strict application of the statute, where special
manufacture has taken place, results in more than a loss of bargain for a
change in position has taken place. If an oral contract existed its unen-
forceability would therefore cause greater injustice to honest manufacturers
than in like situations involving standard goods.4 T Since it is the change of
position which justifies this alternate method of satisfying the statute, it is
logical to restrict this method to the quantum of goods affected by this
change. The quantum furnishes an implied quantity requirement which will
limit the extent of recovery.
The clause requiring "circumstances which reasonably indicate that the
goods are for the buyer" is troublesome. It is possible that this indicates
that the fact that the goods are of value to the buyer alone is not enough
to bring the transaction within this subsection. This possibility exists be-
cause the "reasonable circumstance" clause follows the "specially manu-
factured" requirement and may be presumed to be more than a mere re-
dundancy. If change of position as a result of special manufacture is the
heart of this alternate method, it may be argued that the "reasonable cir-
cumstance" clause should be construed as incidental to the requirement of
special manufacture. If it is desirable to give the phrase independent meaning,
it could be regarded as a safety valve. Its function would be to preclude the
operation of the exception when it .
 is obvious that a final agreement was not
reached despite the fact that special manufacture has commenced. The
utility of such a safety device may be questioned for in such an obvious
situation the charging party would undoubtedly fail to prove the contract
to the trier of fact.
Under the Code the seller may manufacture the special product himself
or may procure the product from someone else. The last sentence in this
subsection makes reference to such procurement. This was not necessarily
the law under the Sales Act which referred to "goods maufactured by the
seller." (Emphasis supplied.) Some courts gave this language a literal
interpretation."
48
 Uniform Sales Act If 4.
47 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 4, lr 477.
48
 Atlas Shoe Co. v. Rosenthal, 242 Mass. 15, 136 N.E. 107 (1922). An opposite
result was reached in E. G. Young Lumber Co. v. New York Hondstone Corp., 15 Misc.
2d 985, 179 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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It has been argued that this method of satisfying the statute of frauds
should be abandoned under the Code as Proponents of this proposition
contend that the danger of an unethical special manufacturer succeeding
in proving a nonexistent contract is a real one, particularly where there
have been prior dealings between the parties. They point out that special
manufacturers may protect themselves in Code jurisdictions by writing letters
of confirmation that would bring any transaction within the purview of
2-201(2).w Although this argument assumes that both parties to the oral
contract are merchants, this would be the situation in most cases.
3. Admissions
2-201(3) (b). A contract which does not satisfy the require-
ments of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits
in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for
sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this pro-
vision beyond the quantity of goods admitted. . . .
This method of satisfying the statute of frauds has no counterpart under
the Sales Act. ft may or may not be consistent with the previous law of the
forum regarding admissions, but is logical in that it precludes a party from ad-
mitting the contract on the one hand while denying its enforceability on the
other.
The apparent key to this subsection lies in the past tense statement of
the admission "that a contract for sale was made." (Emphasis supplied.)
Again, the Code searches for assurance that "a real transaction" supports the
allegation that a contract exists. 5 ' If the denying party admits that a con-
tract existed, this indicates that the charging party is not engaged in a mere
legal powerplay designed to foist a totally unfounded claim upon the denying
party. The admission that a contract did exist does not establish the present
existence of a contract,52 but only allows the charging party to present his
oral evidence to the jury.
An extension of this subsection's applicability beyond the pleadings and
into the pre-trial procedure is quite feasible since admissions made in "testi-
mony or otherwise in court" are also within the purview of 2-201(h). The Code
is not specific on the subject, but the issue has been raised by one authority. 5"
This extension might be effectively argued where the proponent of the con-
tract was otherwise stymied by the statute.
It is arguable that a demurrer constitutes an admission of the existence
of a contract, but it has been held that "a preliminary objection in the
nature of a demurrer would not seem to be the type of pleading contemplated
by Section 3 (b) of the Act."54
Another point of conjecture is the possibility of forcing the party, seek-
49
 Hawkland, op. cit. supra note 12.
59 Id. at 34.
51 Comment 1 to UCC § 2-201.
52 Comment 7 to UCC § 2-201.
53 Hawkland, op. cit. supra note 12, at 32.
54 Beter v. Helman, 41 West. 7 (Pa. 1958).
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ing the refuge of the statute, to admit the existence of an oral contract while
under oath. It is again suggested that the proponent of the contract might
do well to attempt such a gambit."
In this provision the Code draftsmen have again made restrictive use of
a specific quantity requirement, i.e., "not enforceable under this provision
beyond the quantity of goods admitted." A party may slip on an admission
and plunge into this subsection, but the quantity requirement serves as a
life line restricting the party's fall to the extent of the quantity admitted.
This subsection calls for the admission of a prior "contract"" so it
would evidently exclude admissions of certain isolated terms as sufficient to
neutralize the statute. Thus, even though quantity might be admitted as a
separate term, how many terms might be admitted before the court would
declare that there was a prior contract?
It is questionable whether the required statement of quantity must be
specifically admitted by the charged party. It might be deemed sufficient if
he admitted the past existence of the contract where the proponent of the
contract stated the quantity. The situation is similar to that treated under
2-201(2) where a quantity requirement was sought to be established by
incorporating the confirmation and the objection. The same compromise solu-
tion might be suggested, requiring the admission to make reference to the
quantity terms of the proponent's contract.
4. Payment or Acceptance
2-201(3)(c). A contract which does not satisfy the require-
ments of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable with respect to goods for which payment has been
made and accepted or which have been received and accepted.
Under the Sales Act 57
 the entire contract is taken outside the statute
of frauds if "the buyer shall accept part of the goods."88
 The Code provides
for only a partial removal from the statute if only a part of the goods are
received and accepted or paid for. The official comment to the Code states
that "if the court can make a just apportionment ... the agreed price of
any goods actually delivered can be recovered without a writing or, if the
price has been paid, the seller can be forced to deliver an apportionable part
of the goods." ' 9
 The textual wording and the comment's insistence on appor-
tionment indicate that a quantitative control has been built into this sub-
section.
Partial performance is an overt admission of a contract but does not
extend beyond the scope of the partial performance. Beyond that point there
is no reasonably certain basis for granting relief. Thus the quantity paid for
55
 Hawkland, op. cit. supra note 12, at 31.
56 UCC § 1-201:
(11) "Contract" means the total legal obligation which results from the
parties agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of law.
57 Uniform Sales Act § 4.
58 .Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 283 Pa. 434, 129 Atl. 559 (1925) ;
Producers Coke Co. v. Hoover, 268 Pa. 104, 110 AU. 733 (1920).
59 Comment 2 to UCC § 2-201.
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or received sets the limit of recovery and furnishes the implied quantity
requirement (which was previously referred to and is common to the other
subsections).
A lower court in Pennsylvania has supported the apportionment posi-
tion of the official comment by holding that a down payment on indivisible
goods is insufficient to take the contract out of the statute." Subsection (c)
makes reference to section 2-606 which defines acceptance of goods. Of par-
ticular interest is 2-606(2) which states that "acceptance of a part of any
commercial unit is acceptance of .that entire unit." This would modify the
language of 2-201(3) (c) by taking the entire commercial unit" out of the
statute even where there has been only a partial acceptance or payment.
However, when dealing with a commercial unit, there is no problem of
apportionment because a party would normally not accept or pay for a
portion of the unit without intending to pay for or receive the entire unit.
II. SECTION 2-202. FINAL WRITTEN EXPRESSION: PAROL OR
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
A. INTRODUCTION—A TRADITIONAL STATEMENT OF THE RULE
"When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a
writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate in-
tegration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of ante-
cedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose
of varying or contradicting the writing."62 Thus, succinctly stated, there is
little indication that the parol evidence rule has proved to be a nominal
paradox" which has been sometimes lauded, 64 sometimes lamented" and
of ttimes litigated.
It has been said that the rule finds its justification in the stability it
affords written contracts through precluding their modification by prior and
contemporaneous agreements.°° Implicit in such a statement is the object of
preventing fraud via perjury 8 7
60
 Williamson v. Martz, 11 Pa, D, & C.2d 33, 19 Mon. Leg. R. 24, 29 Northum Leg.
J. 32 (1956).
01 UCC § 2-105:
(6) "Commercial unit" means such a unit of goods as by commercial usage
is a single whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs
its character or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a
single article (as a machine) or a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an
assortment of sizes) or a quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other
unit treated in use or in the relevant market as a single whole.
02 3 Corbin, Contracts § 573 (1960); quoted in Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v.
Thompson, 273 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1959).
63 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2400 (3d ed. 1940): "It is the accepted present day view
that the parol evidence rule is not really a rule of evidence but is instead a rule of sub-
stantive law."
04 C.
 L. Webster Co. v. Trinidad Bean & Elevator Co., 92 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1937):
"the commerce of this vast country could not be carried on if written contracts of the
character of the one here, plain and unambiguous in its terms could be breached at will
without any resulting liability."
65 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 62, § 575.
66 Hoffman v. Late, 222 Ark. 395, 260 S.W.2d 446 (1953); Albers Milling Co. v.
Donaldson, 156 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Ark. 1957).
67 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 65.
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B. THE BASIC RULE DEFINED BY THE CODE
2-202. Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memo-
randa of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a
writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agree-
ment with respect to such terms as are included therein may not
be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a con-
temporaneous oral agreement. . . .
The first clause in the Code's statement of the rule is "terms with
respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.) Since the disjunctive or separates the first and second
clauses the two must be read and interpreted as independent, though related
clauses.
It appears that the Code is using language which is significantly differ-
ent from that which is normally used in discussing the rule." Although this
initial phrase is expressed in the plural referring to "confirmatory memoranda
of the parties," the usual statement of the rule is in terms of a singular
writing,°° a singular contract" or a "single" integration" which has been
adopted by both parties. The Code's rules of construction dictate that words
used in the plural include the singular." However, this explicit use of the
plural in stating the rule is too unique to warrant such a cavalier dismissal
of the problem by a mere reference to the cited construction clause.
It is possible for a plurality of writings to comprise the ultimate con-
tract or final integration, but it is customary to refer to this sum of the
writings in the singular. If the Code's use of the plural referred to separate
parts of a single instrument, the requirement that these memoranda agree
would call for a redundancy within the instrument. The only logical explana-
tion is that the plural is used to refer to two or more writings which have
been separately executed by both parties. Under this interpretation, the
requirement that the terms agree does not result in a redundancy.
The Code's use of the word "memoranda" is significant apart from its
plurality. Some courts have held that the rule is inapplicable when the
writing involved does not constitute a complete contract, 73 but the word
"memoranda" itself may express something less than a complete contract.
The natural import of this entire first clause is that the scope of the
rule has been expanded in two directions: (1) The agreement need not be
expressed in a singular writing executed by both parties, but may be voiced
in two or more separately executed writings, and (2) the rule is operative
on mere terms of agreement though the total effect of all the writings does
not constitute a complete contract.
08 See note 62 supra.
69 Werner v. Steele, 8 III. App. 2d 460, 131 N.E.2d 820 (1956).
70 La Cava v. Breedlove, 77 Cal. App. 2d 129, 174 P.2d 880 (1946).
71 Restatement, Contract § 237 (1932).
72 UCC § 1-102 (5):
In this Act unless the context otherwise requires
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in the plural in-
clude the singular.
73 Welch v. Bombardieri, 252 Mass. 84, 147 N.E. 595 (1925).
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Some qualification and clarification would appear to be needed as to
the genesis of the confirmatory memoranda. Unless such writings originate
from a common understanding, there is nothing to confirm and the rule is
inapplicable. It would appear necessary to require that the confirmatory
memoranda indicate that there was a meeting of the minds as opposed to a
statement of identical terms at different stages of negotiation. In the latter
situation there is no agreement. It would be desirable for the memoranda
to recite the moment of the agreement so that there will be no difficulty in
ascertaining whether parol evidence is prior to or contemporaneous with the
agreement.
The second clause in the Code's statement of the rule applies to terms
"which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement. . ." This clause appears to be more in
line with traditional expressions of the rule," but, like the first clause, it
is applicable to any terms on which there has been an agreement. That
agreement must be in writing, but the Code does not require the writing
to contain all of the requisites of a contract.
A determination that the parties intended to execute a final expression
of their agreement exists as a prerequisite to the operation of the rule. The
Code does not attempt to dictate any method of resolving this issue and it
may be presumed that the various jurisdictions will continue to settle this
question by the application of pre-Code standards. 75
The codification of the rule in no way mentions a complete agreement,
contract or integration. It simply provides that the rule shall extend to
terms meeting the requirements of the section. Conspicuous by its absence is
any reference to a finalized understanding. The official comment to the
Code contains a rejection of any assumption that a writing final in some
respects encompasses all areas of agreement."
This discussion has centered on what is needed to cause the operation
of the rule. An examination of the Code's language stating the effect of the
rule indicates that it prohibits the contradiction of protected writings by
evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement.
The substance of this provision is very much in accord with traditional
statements of the rule. 77
C. THE WRITING MAY BE EXPLAINED OR SUPPLEMENTED
The subsection following the basic rule permits the explanation and sup-
plementation of terms otherwise within the purview of the rule. The Code
does not attempt to provide an answer to the problem of how many degrees
separate an explanation from a contradiction.
74 See note 62 supra.
75 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 1102 (1939).
76 Comment 1 to UCC § 2-202 states:
This section definitely rejects: (a) Any assumption that because a writing
has been worked out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as in-
cluding all the matters agreed upon .. .
77 See note 62 supra.
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1. Course of Dealing, Usage of the Trade or Course of Performance
2-202(a). Terms that are not to be contradicted because of the
rule "may be explained or supplemented ... by course of dealing or
usage of trade" or by course of performance."'" [Footnote added.]
As a general distinction it might be said that "course of dealing"
refers to conduct between the parties "previous to the agreement"" while
"course of performance" refers to activity having taken place in recognition
of the agreement. The term "usage of trade" may be loosely defined as any
regularly observed custom within a given vocation or a geographic area.
The official Code comment states that "the meaning of the agreement
of the parties is to be determined by the language used by them and by
their action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and
other surrounding circumstances." 8 ' The zeal with which the courts may
greet this doctrine and apply it to parol evidence cases is uncertain, but
a Pennsylvania court has fervently embraced this concept of commercial
custom.82
In the cited case an automobile dealer personally guaranteed a loan
for the purchase of a new automobile. In the written agreement he waived
"all notices to which [he] might be entitled." There was evidence that the
original insurance contract on the automobile was cancelled and that the
plaintiff bank so notified the dealer. Another policy was obtained, but was
discontinued for failure to pay the premium. Although the bank was notified
of this cancellation, it failed to notify the dealer. Thereafter, an accident
resulted in a total loss of the automobile. In an action on the note in which
the dealer set up as a defense the bank's failure to notify him of the second
cancellation, the bank argued that the dealer had specifically waived "all
notices."
The trial court allowed the dealer to introduce parol evidence that it
was customary for dealers to be notified of such cancellations. The superior
court held that the waiver applied only to notices under the written agree-
78 UCC § 1 -205:
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing
a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question, The existence
and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that such
a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation
of the writing is for the court.
79 UCC § 2 - 208:
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance
by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and op-
portunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted
or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning
of the agreement.
89 Comment 2 to UCC § 1-205.
81 Comment 1 to UCC § 1-205.
82 Provident Tradesmen Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 720(1960), aff'd per curiam, 196 Pa. Super. 180, 173 A.2d 780 (1961).
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ment and not to those required by usage of the trade which usage would
have to be carefully negated. It should be noted that the holding is in accord
with the official comment which states that unless course of dealing, usage
of the trade or course of performance are carefully negated, "they have
become an element of the meaning of the words used.""
Two judges in a dissenting opinion stressed the fact that the dealer
had waived his right to all notices in unequivocal language. Some support
for this position might be found in the wording of section 2-208(2) which
provides that "express terms shall control course of performance and course
of performance shall control both course of dealing and usage of trade"
whenever a construction consistent to all the above terms would be un-
reasonable. The majority would probably contend that their consistent
construction was not unreasonable.
While the instant case appears to be the only one under the Code that
has directly considered the problem, it may indicate the manner in which
liberally disposed courts might maneuver within the framework of the Code.
The cited case should also serve as a caveat to the draftsman to
specifically exclude the use of such evidence if this be the desire of his
client. When an individual practice or custom is specifically negated in the
writing, contrary parol evidence attempts to do more than explain or
supplement and must be excluded as a contradiction within the meaning of
the main body of the rule. A general exclusion of parol evidence within
the scope of subsection (a) might be more difficult to accomplish, but
might be achieved by a written expression of intent to exclude such evidence.
Speculation on this latter possibility may be largely academic, because,
unless the parties can conceive of specific usages and customs they intend
to exclude, the probabilities are that they will wish to have the terms of the
writing explained and supplemented by parol evidence of their cusoms and
practices.
There is no express requirement within this subsection of finding an
incomplete contract. Some courts may now receive parol evidence of custom
and usage where they previously would have excluded it if the contract
appeared to be complete on its face." Similarly, the Code expresses no
requirement for the finding of ambiguous language prior to the receipt of parol
evidence which is used to explain or supplement. Some jurisdictions held this
finding to be a prerequisite to the admission of such evidence. 85 The official
comment states that this definitely rejects "the requirement that a condition
precedent to the admissibility of the type of evidence specified in paragraph
(a) is an original determination by the court that the language used is
ambiguous." 85
2. Consistent Additional Terms
2-202 (b). Terms that are not to be contradicted because of
the rule may be explained or supplemented by evidence of con-
83 Comment 2 to UCC § 2-202.
84 In re Gill's Estate, 314 Pa. 558, 171 Atl. 457 (1934) ; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 999
(1942).
85 E.g., Violette v. Rice, 173 Mass. 82, 53 N.E. 144 (1899).
80 Comment 1 to UCC § 2-202.
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sistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have
been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement.
It has been maintained that consistent additional terms may be added
to an incomplete written contract by parol evidence. 87
 This subsection
codifies this position. The introduction of such terms is allowed without
tethering their admissibility to usage or custom which is the subject of the
prior subsection. A finding by the court that the writing was not intended
as a complete statement of the terms of the contract operates as a "condition
subsequent"88
 precluding the introduction of oral testimony. Such an in-
quiry into the intent of the parties was not uncommon prior to the Code,"
but some doubt may have existed as to the propriety of the court making
this determination rather than the fact finder." This question of propriety
now appears to be settled by the Code's express delegation of this duty to
the court.
Courts dealing with the rule have long been making findings as to the
intent of the parties to enter into complete and exclusive written agree-
ments.°1
 These decisions will probably be applied in determining the question
of intent within this subsection. The Code offers some guidance by way of
an official comment which states that:
If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would
certainly have been included in the document in the view of the
court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the
trier of fact.°2
The only case decided under the Code appears to take a conventional
approach to this finding of intent."
One of the most intriguing problems presented by this section of the
Code concerns the possibility of drafting a merger clause that will effectively
bar parol evidence. Although this possibility has been discussed in con-
junction with the preceding subsection, the exclusion of additional terms,
which are the subject of this subsection, might be more easily accomplished.
Parol evidence introduced under the prior subsection is used to inter-
pret the very meaning of the words used. This presumes that the contracting
parties will carry out their transactions according to established practices
and will express their thoughts in the jargon of their trade. It is submitted
that this presumption does not apply where the purpose of the parol evidence
87 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 62, § 584; Restatement, Contracts § 240(1) (1932).
88 The positioning of the word "unless" behind the phrase of admission indicates
that the issue of intent would have to be raised before the court would consider the
exclusion of such evidence.
89 4 Williston, Contracts § 633 (3d ed. 1961) ; Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 63,
§ 2429; Restatement, Contracts § 228 (1932).
90 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 63, § 2430, indicates that some courts have com-
mitted the error of leaving this determination to the jury.
91 20 Am. Jur. Evidence §§ 1136-37 (1939).
92 Comment 3 to UCC § 2-202.
93 Holland Furnace Co. v. Heidrich, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 204 (1955).
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is to introduce additional terms. Hence, it would be easier to support a
general exclusion of additional terms as being the intent of the parties.
While this position appears logical, it would behoove any competent
draftsman to specifically exclude any additional terms with which his
client is particularly concerned. However, if some additional terms are care-
fully negated via specific reference so as to render any parol evidence a
contradiction, the draftsman must be wary of luring the court into believing
that these are the only additional terms he wishes to negate.
D. PAROL EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE RULE
The parol evidence rule has never operated as a complete and cate-
gorical bar to the receipt of parol evidence. The rule does not operate to
exclude oral testimony of events subsequent to the writing. Even prior and
contemporaneous agreements may be supported by such testimony if the
evidence is being offered for a proper purpose. When the offering party is
attempting to prove that no contract existed" or that the transaction was
actually a nullity" due to fraud, illegality, accident or mistake, parol
evidence will normally be received though it may conflict with the contents
of the writing. It is argued that under such circumstances the imposition of
the rule would tend to cause rather than prevent fraud and injustice."
It is likely that the Code will accept this prior posture of the law for
there is nothing in the Code to indicate otherwise .97 In at least one instance
a lower court has allowed parol evidence to contradict a writing where the
purpose was to prove fraud."
III. CONCLUSION
It has not been the purpose of this comment to form a judgment on
the present day utility of the statute of frauds or the parol evidence rule.
Both will probably continue to be the controversial subject of case and
comment, but the Code has attempted to mitigate many of the prior ine-
quities and inconsistencies connected with the statute and the rule. With
the more obvious evils eliminated by virtue of codification in a uniform act,
it seems certain that both the statute and the rule will enjoy an increased
longevity in the United States.
This comment, in the nature of a verbal anatomy, has endeavored to
examine the operation of two Code sections and to anticipate problems
that will undoubtedly be litigated as the courts undertake the ponderous
process of interpreting the Code. Sir Francis Bacon observed that "some
books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed
and digested." Our reading complete, it is evident that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code is of the third variety. The bite taken is admittedly small, but
I would hope that it has been sufficiently chewed and digested.
JOHN P. KANE
94 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 62, 	 577.
95 Id.	 580,
99 Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass, 170, 31 N.E.2d 551 (1941); Dallas Farm Mach.
Co. v. Reaves, 158 Tex. 1, 307 S.W.2d 233 (1957).
97 UCC 1 - 103.
98 Wachtman v. Derran Food Plan, 71 Dauph, Co. 121 (Pa. 1957).
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